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Introduction 
In the last few decades, great progress has been made 
in both genetic and genomic research. The develop-
ment of the Human Genome Project has increased 
our knowledge of the genetic basis of diseases and has 
given a tremendous momentum to the development of 
new technologies that make widespread genetic test-
ing possible and has increased the availability of previ-
ously inaccessible genetic information. Two examples 
of this exponential evolution are the increasing imple-
mentation of next-generation sequencing technolo-
gies in the clinical context and the expanding com-
mercial offer of genetic tests directly-to-consumers.
Firstly, the rapid development of next generation 
sequencing technologies (i.e., high-throughput and 
massively parallel DNA sequencing technologies) 
has substantially reduced both the cost and the time 
required to sequence an entire human genome. These 
technologies are increasingly being used in the clinical 
setting with the goal of diagnosing conditions of pre-
sumed genetic origin that cannot be explained by tar-
geted sequencing approaches. By exploring the whole 
genome of individuals, the likelihood of detecting 
genetic variants with reproductive or clinical implica-
tions, as well as genetic variants with unknown sig-
nificance, becomes an increasing reality.1 Cases are 
being reported about the implementation of next 
generation sequencing technologies in adults2 as well 
as in children.3 A recent publication also showed the 
potential benefit of using exome sequencing or whole 
genome sequencing (WGS) in a symptomatic new-
born, allowing in a short time, the differential diag-
nosis and faster progression to genetic and prognostic 
counseling.4 Looking at the entire genome will reveal 
“incidental” findings, which are unrelated to the clini-
cal request, as well as a number of genetic variants for 
which the meaning remains unclear. This new situa-
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tion challenges and intensifies debates about clinical 
utility, policies regarding return of results, and proce-
dures with regard to informed consent.5 
Secondly, more and more companies are advertising 
and/or selling direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests. 
The types of DTC genetic tests available are broad, 
from preconceptional carrier tests for single-gene dis-
orders, such as cystic fibrosis (predicting a high risk of 
having affected offspring if both partners are carriers) 
to genetic association tests for predisposition to com-
plex, multifactorial diseases, such as depression and 
cardiovascular disease.6 In addition to providing test 
results DTC, some commercial companies also made 
recommendations regarding lifestyle changes on the 
basis of these results, such as changes in diet or use 
of nutritional supplements.7 Various critiques have 
been raised regarding DTC genetic testing, including 
the lack of clinical validity and clinical utility of the 
tests being sold; the lack of quality control of the tests 
and laboratories involved in test provision as well as 
the qualifications of the personnel involved; the (mis-
leading or unclear) advertisement of genetic tests; the 
inadequate process of informed consent and genetic 
counseling; the inappropriate genetic testing of chil-
dren; the lack of individualized medical supervision; 
the downstream impact on the health care system; 
and the potential infringement of research ethics 
guidelines.8 
A particular concern in both situations is how the 
volume of novel information will affect the process-
ing of genetic and genomic information from minors. 
Although testing minors when there is a direct health 
benefit for the child is relatively uncontroversial, con-
cerns remain about the ethical responsibility of par-
ents and health care professionals with respect to the 
release of information that is of no immediate use 
for a child’s health. At this moment, clinical-ethical 
guidelines9 argue that testing in minors is only rec-
ommended when “established, effective, and impor-
tant medical treatment”10 is available, or when testing 
“provides scope for treatment which to any essential 
degree prevents, defers or alleviates the outbreak of 
disease or the consequences of the outbreak of dis-
ease.”11 The rationale behind this position is that, 
unless genetic testing earlier in life is in the best inter-
est of the minor, testing in minors “should be delayed 
until the person is old enough to make an informed 
choice.”12 For minors it is argued that in the provision 
of genetic testing, their “right not to know” should be 
respected as much as possible. Testing a minor early 
in life eliminates the possibility for the minor to make 
use of his or her “right not to know.” 
Various legislative systems have recognized the 
“right not to know” as a patient’s right. Gener-
ally speaking, individuals have a right to expressly 
instruct health care professionals against disclosure 
of specific personal health information. This gives 
individuals the ability to control their own personal 
health information and practice their “right not to 
know.” Nevertheless, most statutes allow information 
to be disclosed to prevent or reduce a risk of serious 
bodily harm to an identifiable person. The “right not 
to know” has been predominantly recognized in the 
processing of genetic information, respecting individ-
uals’ wish not to be informed about specific genetic 
information or not to be tested for a specific genetic 
condition. For example, this right was integrated in 
article 5c of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights: “the right 
of every individual to decide whether or not to be 
informed of the results of genetic examination and 
the resulting consequences should be respected.”13 
Article 10 (2) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine also states that “Everyone is 
entitled to know any information collected about his 
or her health. However, the wishes of individuals not 
to be so informed shall be observed.” 
The objective of this article is to discuss the “right 
not to know” with regard to the increasing availabil-
ity of genomic testing and consequently the increased 
possibility of having genomic information processed 
from minors. The first part of the article discusses two 
A particular concern is how the volume of novel information will affect  
the processing of genetic and genomic information from minors.  
Although testing minors when there is a direct health benefit for the child 
 is relatively uncontroversial, concerns remain about the ethical responsibility 
of parents and health care professionals with respect to the release of 
information that is of no immediate use for a child’s health.
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theoretical underpinnings of the “right not to know”: 
the respect for future autonomy and the respect for 
privacy. It is followed by a discussion of the concept 
of best interests in relation to the “right not to know.” 
The second part of the article analyzes the reasons 
why various direct-to-consumer companies process 
samples from minors. The last part of the articles 
analyses various issues that are at stake when consid-
ering genetic testing for common complex disorders 
in a pediatric population.
The Right Not to Know and the  
Respect for Future Autonomy
The respect for autonomy is often advanced as the the-
oretical basis for the “right not to know.”14 The choice 
of not knowing certain information is considered as 
an expression of the own choices of an individual, 
which could be framed as a right to informational self-
determination. In this case it is not the physician who 
decides what information to provide to the patient, 
but it is the patient who fully takes on the responsibil-
ity and the action of deciding which information he or 
she wants or does not want to receive.
The right not to know has also been advanced as a 
relevant right for minors. Although a child may not 
have the necessary competence and maturity to take 
autonomous decisions now, there are important rea-
sons to keep certain future options open and not limit 
them by current decisions that do not need to be made 
now. This was defined by Joel Feinberg as a “right to 
an open future.”15 Feinberg called these rights “rights-
in-trust”: rights that have to be preserved for the child 
until he is an adult.
The concept of the “right to an open future” and the 
“right not to know” has also been applied in the con-
text of genetic testing in children. Regarding the spe-
cific case of predictive genetic testing for Huntington’s 
disease, Dena Davis comments: 
The notion of the child’s right to an open future 
can help in confronting the question of whether 
to test children for adult-onset genetic diseases, 
for example Huntington disease. It is well known 
that the vast majority of adults at risk for Hun-
tington disease choose not to be tested. However, 
it is not uncommon for parents to request that 
their children be tested; their goals may be to set 
their minds at rest, to plan for the future, and so 
on. On one account, parental authority to make 
medical decisions suggests that clinicians should 
accede to these requests (after proper counsel-
ing about possible risks). A better account, in 
my opinion, protects the child’s right to an open 
future by preserving into adulthood his own 
choice to decide whether his life is better lived 
with that knowledge or without.16 
The future autonomy of the child may outweigh the 
autonomy of parents in this context and might justify 
the withholding of information from parents. In this 
case information appears as belonging to the infor-
mational self-determination of the child as future 
adult. Therefore, the future child’s personal consent 
as an adult takes precedence over the potential actual 
parental choice.
This rationale was recently confirmed by the British 
Society for Human Genetics guidelines on “Genetic 
Testing in Children” (in the context of performing 
predictive and pre-symptomatic testing on asymp-
tomatic minors) by recommending that “in such cir-
cumstances testing should normally be delayed until 
the young person can decide for him/herself when, or 
whether, to be tested.”17
The Right Not to Know and the  
Respect for Privacy
Graeme Laurie highlighted that in addition to auton-
omy as an underlying theoretical underpinning of the 
right not to know, another basis is a special type of spa-
tial privacy, in which an individual’s self is being pro-
tected. “Spatial privacy (…) ensures that the individual 
herself is in a state of non-access. An obvious example 
of this is physical separateness from others — physical 
spatial privacy is invaded when one’s physical sphere 
is invaded — if, for example, we are not permitted to 
be alone. However, spatial privacy also encompasses 
separateness of the individual’s psyche….”18 
In relation to minors, the spatial privacy of the child 
requires that one refrains from processing any sensi-
tive or private information which is not of immedi-
ate use to the child. This is not only based on the fact 
that certain information might create potential harm 
for the child. It may also disrespect potential future 
wishes of that child and undermine the previously 
described respect for autonomy. Secondly, it might 
also compromise the spatial privacy interests. 
Control of information about ourselves must be 
an essential part of any concept of ourselves as 
autonomous persons, but “control” should not 
be limited merely to control of who has access 
to that information. It should also include the 
facility not to accept the information ab initio. 
A concept of “control” which is wide enough to 
encompass this notion permits us to retain a pri-
vate sphere that is truly our own. Furthermore, it 
allows us to maintain that unsolicited revelations 
of personal information is an invasion of that 
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sphere, even when such revelations about our-
selves are made to ourselves.19 
The Right Not to Know and the  
Best Interests of the Child
When considering health care decisions involving 
children, the concept of “best interests” takes a central 
position. In particular in relation to incompetent or 
immature minors, parents have the authority to make 
decisions on behalf of their children, which should 
be in their “best interests.” Allen Buchanan and Dan 
Brock defined this as “acting to promote the good of 
the individual to the maximum extent.”20 This concept 
has been frequently used in the academic literature in 
relation to various ethical discussion related to health-
care decisions involving children.21 Moreover, various 
international documents, such as the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union22; the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights23; or the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child24 advance that the “best interests” concept 
should be a standard in decisions involving children. 
Article 3.1 of the latter document stipulates that “in 
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken 
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts 
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bod-
ies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.”25
The importance to act in the best interests of minors 
automatically points to the limitations of the right not 
to know. Like most rights, the right not to know is not 
an absolute one. When the disclosure of information is 
necessary in order to avoid a serious harm to the child 
or in order to initiate preventive measures or therapy, 
this provides a justification for performing a certain 
(genetic) test. There is a broad consensus regarding 
medical benefit, whereby a genetic test is likely to pro-
vide useful information for the medical management 
of the child. In this situation, the test is either permis-
sible or even obligatory.26 What is in the best interest 
of a minor, however, is not always crystal-clear. 
The Right Not to Know and Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing
An illustrative example of debates around the inter-
pretation of what are the best interests of minors 
can be gleaned in the discussions surrounding DTC 
genetic testing.27 In 2008, an analysis of DTC compa-
nies’ websites, including their consent forms, terms of 
services and privacy policy statements indicated that 
various companies allow genetic testing in minors 
upon parental request and/or authorization.28 A 
questionnaire study (collecting information directly 
from the companies) aimed at obtaining informa-
tion regarding the policies on genetic testing in chil-
dren also indicated that not only would some of these 
companies perform genetic testing in minors under 
parental or legal guardian requests, but that a large 
majority of the responding companies had already 
received requests from parents or legal guardians to 
test minors.29 
Different reasons might explain why various DTC 
companies accept to process samples from minors. 
Firstly, limiting the pool of individuals from which 
tests can be processed, might also limit the total num-
ber of tests processed. It is financially more interesting 
for a DTC company when entire families can buy their 
services at once. Therefore, there are various examples 
of companies that provide price reductions on orders 
including more than one individual. For example, 
easyDNA provides a discount when you order tests for 
more than one person at a time.30 
Secondly, various companies underline that their 
services provide individuals with information that 
gives them insights into potential future health risks 
and enables them to initiate behavioral and lifestyle 
The importance to act in the best interests of minors automatically points 
to the limitations of the right not to know. Like most rights, the right not 
to know is not an absolute one. When the disclosure of information is 
necessary in order to avoid a serious harm to the child or in order to initiate 
preventive measures or therapy, this provides a justification for performing 
a certain (genetic) test. There is broad consensus regarding medical benefit, 
whereby a genetic test is likely to provide useful information for the medical 
management of the child, the test is either permissible or even obligatory.
What is in the best interest of a minor, however, is not always crystal-clear. 
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changes. Therefore, the companies offering these ser-
vices claim that the information provided might not 
only be helpful for adults, but also for children. In 
response to the previously mentioned questionnaire, 
various companies stated that genetic testing in chil-
dren can be useful.31 A company stated that “[n]on-
medical genetic information can help parents better 
understand their child’s innate strengths and weak-
nesses, and help in successfully raising the child” 
(Company U). Another company stated that “[o]ur 
genetic tests, which are both predictive and clinical in 
nature, can be useful tools in the diagnosis, preven-
tion, and treatment of a wide range of health condi-
tions. The benefits of this function are not limited to 
individuals over the age of 18, and therefore we believe 
that — with parental consent and the guidance and 
interpretation of a qualified physician — our tests may 
be performed on minors as well as on adults” (Com-
pany S).
Thirdly, the companies that allow genetic testing of 
minors underline that decisions about genetic testing 
of minors belong to the realm of parental discretion. 
In contrast to the view that predictive genetic testing 
of asymptomatic minors should be limited to consid-
erations of best interests and an open future, the advo-
cated position is that parents are entitled to make deci-
sions with regard to genetic testing of their children. 
In a previous study, it has been reported that various 
DTC genetic testing companies advance in their terms 
of service that the parent or guardian assumes full 
responsibility for ensuring that the information that 
he/she provides about his or her child is kept secure 
and that the information submitted is accurate.32 This 
suggests that the decision about this type of testing is 
similar to other types of health care decisions that par-
ents typically make.
In conclusion, by testing minors, these DTC genetic 
testing companies implicitly discard the notion that 
genomic information is something over which indi-
viduals should have control. Interestingly, this is con-
tradictory to their explicit position about why consum-
ers should be able to get tested DTC. Furthermore, by 
testing minors they send a message that they do not 
consider it to be disrespectful towards the autonomy 
of a future adult, nor that it compromises the above 
mentioned idea of spatial privacy — both notions 
which theoretically underpin the notion of the right 
not to know. 
The Right Not to Know and Genetic Testing 
for Common Complex Disorders in Children
The fact that various DTC genetic testing companies 
process samples from minors challenges some of the 
basic principles that have been accepted in clinical 
practice with regard to the predictive genetic testing of 
minors and which were endorsed by various medical 
and genetic associations in the context of monogenic 
disorders.33 However, these guidelines were elabo-
rated with predictive genetic testing or carrier testing 
of monogenetic conditions in mind. In this context, 
ethical reflection34 has always been concerned with 
the careful transfer of information about genetic tests 
and test results, the confidentiality of genetic informa-
tion, the voluntariness of requesting a genetic test, the 
responsibility towards blood relatives, and the (poten-
tial) psychosocial impact of a test on the applicant.35 
An even more cautious approach has been envisaged 
when considering such testing in children and adoles-
cents. As the “right not to know” is meant to provide 
individuals the possibility of an open future, based on 
the underlying values of respect for autonomy and 
privacy, an important question is to what extent this 
principle should apply to genetic testing for common 
complex disorders. As described earlier, the provision 
of medical benefit (in terms of therapeutic or preven-
tive benefit) has been advanced as a legitimate rea-
As the “right not to know” is meant to provide individuals the possibility of 
an open future, based on the underlying values of respect for autonomy and 
privacy, an important question is to what extent this principle should apply 
to genetic testing for common complex disorders. As described earlier, the 
provision of medical benefit (in terms of therapeutic or preventive benefit) 
has been advanced as a legitimate reason to test minors in clinical ethical 
guidelines. Most DTC companies offer predictive genomic testing that 
provides risk information for common complex disorders. A major  
discussion revolves around the value of this type of information. 
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son to test minors in clinical ethical guidelines. Most 
DTC companies offer predictive genomic testing that 
provides risk information for common complex dis-
orders. A major discussion revolves around the value 
of this type of information. Beth Tarini et al.36 defend 
that “predictive genomic testing may be able to iden-
tify an individual’s risk for developing common treat-
able, and possibly preventable disorders which can 
promote environmental modifications, such as life-
style and health behavior change.”37 The underlying 
vision advanced here is that through the possibility of 
offering this type of testing, individuals will be able to 
change their lifestyle and behavior, and consequently 
reduce their chances of developing certain conditions. 
As various risk factors (e.g., smoking, diet, or physical 
activity) for common disorders are initiated in child-
hood or before adulthood, some might argue that ear-
lier lifestyle and behavior changes will improve overall 
health.38 
The confirmed presence of medical benefits would 
provide a legitimate justification to perform this type 
of predictive testing in minors. Most of the genetic 
tests for common complex disorders, however, have 
a low predictive value. “Most genetic variants may 
only alter the disease susceptibility risk by a factor 
of 1.1–1.6, and usually a large number of genetic vari-
ants will have a bearing on the risk, of which only 
a minority will be known or included in test panels. 
In most cases of polymorphic variants, the predictive 
value would be too small for any intervention to be 
appropriate, and it is disputed whether a combina-
tion of risk variants could confer a sufficiently high 
relative risk to support the recommendation of test-
ing or screening in case risk-reducing interventions 
become available.”39 Common complex disorders are 
caused by an interplay of genetic and environmental 
factors. Therefore, the predictive ability of a model 
using those genetic risk factors is usually limited 
because of the relatively few number of low-risk vari-
ants that have been discovered so far40 and by the 
fact that common complex disorders are only par-
tially heritable.41 Tarini at al.42 provide the example 
that it might be possible to test obese children to see 
whether they have an elevated genetic risk of devel-
oping type 2 diabetes in addition to their risk based 
on the fact that they are obese. However, the utility of 
doing this is questionable as various studies showed 
that genetic risk scores have lower discriminative 
accuracy than clinical risk factors.43 This formed the 
basis of a European guideline that concluded that 
“despite the encouraging progress in our understand-
ing of the genetic basis of T2DM, it is too early to use 
genetic information as a tool for targeting preventive 
efforts.”44 As a conclusion, if the predictive ability is 
limited and preventive options (including lifestyle 
changes) exist without using genomic information 
of debated utility, it is questionable whether the test 
result would lead to any different decision or addi-
tional benefit that exists without using the genomic 
information. DTC companies also justify their genetic 
testing services by referring to the fact that they may 
motivate individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles and 
thus lead to behavior changes. However, the limited 
research with common genetic variants has shown 
that there is little impact on behavior change.45 Con-
sidering that the genetic testing of minors does not 
provide a clear prospect of medical benefit, a ques-
tion remains: does the absence of harm to minors 
justify the undertaking of genetic tests for common 
complex disorders? 
Based on anticipated potential harms, existing pro-
fessional recommendations have always advanced a 
cautionary position towards predictive genetic test-
ing. As we can read, for example, in the Working Party 
of the Clinical Genetics Society: “The potential harms 
caused by childhood genetic testing might include 
damage to the child’s self-esteem, distortion of the 
family’s perceptions of the child, loss of future adult 
autonomy and confidentiality, discrimination against 
the child in education, employment or insurance, and 
adverse effects on the child’s capacity to form future 
relationships.”46 This position has often been criti-
cized because of the fact that these harms were more 
speculative and not based on actual evidence.47 In par-
ticular, related to susceptibility testing for common 
disorders, there is also debate over the possibility that 
such testing might lead to fatalistic behavior, distress, 
or other psychological, relational, or societal effects. 
The current available evidence does not show that the 
information received from DTC companies causes sig-
nificant individual harm, such as increased anxiety or 
worry.48 Based on the absence of proof of harms, some 
have argued that the rationale not to accept genomic 
testing is exaggerated.49 
Nevertheless, focusing the debate on the acceptabil-
ity of this type of testing due to the absence of harms 
to individuals undergoing genomic testing distorts the 
focus of the debate from other relevant issues. Firstly, 
the amount of empirical data is still limited. A sys-
tematic review of the literature concluded that “there 
is insufficient evidence to inform a nuanced undert-
standing of how children respond to genetic testing. 
This suggests a strong need for further research that 
uses rigorous approaches to address children’s emo-
tional states, self-perception, and social wellbeing.”50 
In this regard, Patenaude also concluded that “the 
vulnerabilities of children to genetic information are 
not yet well understood.”51 Moreover, it is also a ques-
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tion whether this issue could be resolved by evidence 
only. Decisions about testing minors might be more 
informed by values and norms than by evidence.
Secondly, harms might not always be situated at the 
individual level, but might be situated at the public 
health level. The premature introduction of genetic 
tests might lead to increased recourse to health care 
professionals within the public health care system, 
including primary care physicians, clinical geneticists, 
or other specialists. If such a referral is based on an 
inappropriate test, it might lead to false negatives and 
false positives, misinterpretations, inappropriate fol-
low-up testing, and unnecessary lifestyle changes or 
preventive actions. Creating this type of downstream 
impact might not only negatively affect the health care 
system, but also patients’ health.52 That being said, in 
the near future more and more genetic tests for com-
mon complex disorders might become available. Their 
introduction should be dependent on the condition 
that sufficient information is available on the clini-
cal validity and utility of those tests and that by doing 
the test additional relevant information can be gained 
about the diagnosis, prognosis, preventive actions, or 
disease management. 
Thirdly, testing minors denies them the opportu-
nity to make these decisions for themselves later on 
in life. On the one hand, we see that adults might 
have various reasons to decide to buy a DTC genetic 
test including motivations related to health, curiosity 
or fascination, genealogy, the willingness to contrib-
ute to research, and for recreational purposes.53 On 
the other hand, we also see that many adults decide 
not to buy these services. They might not be inter-
ested to know if they have an increased risk for spe-
cific disorders that run in the family; they might not 
want to know what their risk profiles are for various 
conditions, or whether they are carrying mutations 
for autosomal recessive or X-linked conditions. They 
might not be interested in contributing to research. 
Although some might argue that everyone has, to 
some extent, an ethical duty to know this kind of 
information, in the case of adults, we definitely 
accept the right not to know this type of information. 
Also DTC genetic testing companies do, in a way, 
accept the notion of spatial privacy by, for example, 
stating that “the only people who should be able to 
see your genetic information are you and those with 
whom you choose to share it.”54 Testing minors for 
common complex disorders ignores the fact that 
minors, once they become adults, may not have the 
same ideas about the desirability of accessing this 
type of information. This is of course true for many 
decisions parents make for their children. Given the 
existing differences between adults about whether or 
not to undergo such testing, and whether or not to 
share genomic information, there are still good rea-
sons not to abandon the “right not to know.” 
Conclusion
Traditionally, predictive genetic testing in minors is 
surrounded by values that emphasize the best inter-
ests of the minors, voluntary choice, autonomous 
decision-making, informed decision-making, respect 
for privacy, and non-directiveness. If the medical ben-
efits are absent or uncertain, then the justification for 
testing is less compelling. A crucial principle in this 
regard is the right not to know, which has been used 
to attribute to minors an informational self-deter-
mination with regard to genetic information. With 
the advent of DTC genetic testing companies, much 
debate has taken place about the legitimacy of this 
principle in this context. Several studies also suggest 
that various parents might have an interest in predic-
tive genomic testing in their children.55 As expressed 
by one of the parents that had their children tested: 
“at a more practical level, I want to give my kids as 
much information as possible about the cocktail they 
are inheriting from my husband and me, so they can 
better manage their health.”56 
The debate about the acceptability of testing minors 
within the realm of DTC genetic testing is complex. It 
is clear that predictive testing for low penetrance vari-
ants does not cause the same ethical, psychological, 
or emotional concerns as predictive testing for highly 
penetrant monogenic conditions. However, given the 
concerns about the limited clinical validity and utility 
of many tests, many concerns persist about the desir-
ability of such testing. These include concerns about 
the limited knowledge of the impact of such testing on 
adults and minors; the potential downstream impact 
on the health care system; and the fact that various 
individuals might make different value-laden choices 
about the desirability of such testing. While it is hard 
to prevent parents in a DTC context from submit-
ting samples from minors to genetic testing compa-
nies, this debate brings to the agenda a much broader 
debate concerning the parental rights to their chil-
dren’s genomic information. While we focused here 
mainly on genetic testing for common complex dis-
orders, the debate expands to other types of genomic 
information. Moreover, the implementation of next 
generation sequencing technologies will increasingly 
raise the question of what kind of information should 
be returned to the families that undergo such testing. 
Current opinions range from returning no incidental 
medical information to returning large amounts of 
information (including personal and familial genetic 
risk factors for disease), to returning all genetic data 
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so that the sequencing data remains available in the 
future.57 The actual character of this debate is exem-
plified within the recent recommendations of the 
American College of Medical Genetics and Genom-
ics.58 In their document on incidental findings in clini-
cal exome and genome sequencing, they advanced 
that “ethical concerns about providing children with 
genetic risk information about adult-onset diseases 
were outweighed by the potential benefit to the future 
health of the child and the child’s parent of discover-
ing an incidental findings where intervention might 
be possible.” This document clearly puts limitations on 
the child’s right to know and considers that the ben-
efits of providing parents the opportunity to discover 
life-threatening risk information supersede the right 
not to know of the child. The debate on the validity 
and the limitations of the “right not to know” will cer-
tainly continue to remain on the agenda of the debates 
on genetic testing in minors, as well as in debates over 
the best interests of children, parental responsibility 
and discretion, and duties of health care professionals.
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